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ABSTRACT
This paper is the second of three reports on the competitor scanning
function in three major multinational firms that had recently moved to set
up a formal system for competitor analysis. In the course of the project
we interviewed 73 people whose job descriptions included formal
responsibility for competitor analysis; 17 people who managed these
"scanners"; 63 people whom the scanners identified as their most
significant internal clients for competitor information; and 8 Information
Technology specialists who were involved in helping the "scanners" develop
systems for handling competitor information.
The first paper presented the assessments of the current state of the
Cl (competitor intelligence) function. To summarize briefly, we found that
most scanners and clients agreed that while competitor intelligence was
extremely important and growing in importance, the function had not met
expectations and needs. There is, however, substantial disagreement on
the principal impediments to effective Cl use and on where the function
should focus its efforts at improvement. Clients put much more stress on
the need for Cl outputs to address current management problems, to have
more value added, and to use more effective analytical techniques. While
CI specialists themselves recognize the importance of improving Cl outputs,
they are more likely to see impediments in factors outside their control,
such as management culture and inadequate allocation of resources to the
function. Scanners also have higher expectations of the potential
contribution of information technology.
Client demands that Cl outputs be more useful raised the question of
how Cl actually is used. Six uses emerged in the course of the
interviews: decision-making and planning, which operate at the level of
action in the organization; legitimation (providing justification for changes
already desired) and inspiration (providing new ideas of how to solve
problems), which operate at the level of organizational routines and
heuristics; and sensitization (making people aware of the relevance of
formidable competitors) and benchmarking, which operate at the level of
basic assumptions. The examples of use given in the client interviews
were dominated by planning, although one-third of the examples were of
uses below the action level.
This paper identifies three dimensions on which value is added to
information. The first is data management (acquisition, classification,
storage, retrieval, editing, verification, presentation, aggregation,
distribution, and assessment); the second is analysis (synthesis, hypothesis,
and assumptions testing); the third is implication. Each dimension
addresses a different question. Data management asks "What do we
know?"; analysis asks "What does it mean?"; and implication asks "How
should we respond?" The potential application of information technology
is greatest in data management, and least in implication.
INTRODUCTION
Two pieces of information land on a manager's desk one day. One is a
message that Competitor X has just approached the chairman of a major
event to inquire about sponsorship. The other is that Competitor Y's
reported earnings have risen 40% over the previous year. In response to
the first item, the manager picks up the phone and makes a preemptive
offer on the event sponsorship. The second item he notes with some
interest and perhaps with some irritation, because he wants an
explanation of the change in performance and a breakdown by product
lines. The first. piece of information has immediate action implications,
without further processing: it is of high value but low value added. The
second requires further information and analysis -- value adding -- before
the action implications, if any, can even begin to be considered.
Managers and competitor scanners alike often carry a model of
information dominated by intrinsic value rather than value adding: that is,
the assignment of value to pieces of information depending on their
intrinsic value in making specific decisions, rather than a model of
information processing which focuses on the value that is added to
information. The scanner who envisions the ultimate success of his
function as unearthing the single piece of information that will produce
the multi-million dollar deal and the manager who wants his scanners to
hand him the key item of CI that will enable him to make that day's
decisions with greater certainty are both carrying a model of Cl that may
be unsuited to their situation. Certain types of firms -- and certain
activities within firms -- depend heavily on timely but low value-added
information. Firms whose industries are dominated y discrete
transactions -- trading companies and construction firms~ are prime
examples -- have to build information systems to collect and distribute
quickly information about an array of aspects of the business
environment, including competitor behaviour as well as pending deals and
business opportunities. Such information, with almost no "processing,"
has immediate action implications. For most firms, however, information
about competitors and competitive situations requires considerably more
"value added" before it can be used.
Defining "value added" for information is a problem that continues to
plague those who study information-processing, because "value" is usually
defined either in terms of use in specific decisions or in individual,
highly subjective terms. For example, one manager told us, "I don't want
a data dump. If the information can't be summarized in a page, it's of
no use to me." Another in the same company said, "I'd rather be
inundated with information and not have time to read it than have it
condensed and screened for me by staff people." For the first manager,
screening and condensing information adds value; for the second, it
reduces it. Is there any way a generic model of "value adding" can be
constructed under such circumstances?
The first manager is assimilating Cl to the dominant organizational
model of information-processing: adding value by standardizing information
and using routinized procedures for summarizing it, so that the volume of
information is reduced at each step of information-processing. This is
indeed a powerful way of adding value to information, but it is not the
only way, as the second manager's comment recognizes. Information may
well gain in value by gathering additional interpretation and contextual
information as it is transmitted within the organization. However,
information processing systems for this kind of information are much less
well-developed than the volume-reduction systems; organizational models
of information processing tend to be based on the treatment of
quantitative data, which is much easier to reduce.
Clearly any effort to develop concepts for information value adding
processes must supplement their focus on the "reduction" models by
including "amplification" models. In addition, it must also move away
from the subjective, individual paradigm of value to a more organizational
model. And finally, it must address the issue of whether, even though
the intrinsic value of pieces of information may be highly context-
specific, it is possible to develop a generic model of how the "pieces" of
information are processed in order to add value. Only then can we begin
to address usefully the question of how the formal Cl function can build
its learning curves in adding value to competitor information.
DIMENSIONS OF VALUE ADDING
We began to conduct our study of competitor analysis in three major
multinational corporations with an explicit sequential model of an
information value adding chain that we hoped to refine and test in the
course of our investigation. However, a very different model began to
emerge from scanners' descriptions of what they did, from their
managers' discussions of changes over time in the Cl function, and from
client perceptions of what made information more or less valuable.
Instead of a "chain" of value adding stages we began to perceive three
interrelated but distinct clusters of value adding activities.
To give just one example of the many comments that led us to the
three-dimension model, here is the reply of one of the "managers of
scanners" to our question about changes over time in the CI function:
"Some expansion has occurred in the amount of
information on competitors, but the main change is the
recognition that more information on competitors isn't what
they need; it's information that is interpreted and tailored to
their needs."
And later in the same interview, in response to a question on what
advice he would give someone succeeding him in the position of managing
the Cl function, he said, "We have to aim more at 'so what?' and 'what
do we do?' rather than just at what are the facts. We no longer need
studies that just document that there are competitive problems."
While the respondent himself did not explicitly identify them, his
remarks and many others like them imply that there are three activity
clusters: getting the information, analyzing it in order to interpret
competitor behaviour, and working on what the company could do in
response. Although much of the attention of clients and scanners alike
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was focused on "getting the information" as a distinct activity, it became
clear in the course of our interviews that acquisition is in fact only one
of a larger set of activities that involve information handling. Reducing
this dimension to "acquisition" is focusing on the tip of an iceberg, with
potentially serious costs for understanding how value is added to
information .
We have labeled this activity cluster "Data Management" because it goes
well beyond acquisition of information to include many aspects of the
manipulation of information without any transformation of its basic
content. It includes ten processes: acquisition, classification, storage,
retrieval, editing, verification and "quality control", presentation (i.e. the
choice of format), aggregation (as in the production of newsletters),
distribution, and assessment (the collection of information on client
reactions to the output of the Cl function). The second dimension is
"analysis". It involves primarily three processes: synthesis (putting
information together so as to assemble a complete picture that is more
than the sum of the parts); hypothesis (which involves the development of
scenarios and "what if" techniques of analysis); and assumption building
and testing (the continuing explication and testing of the underlying
assumptions that guide synthesis and hypothesis). The third dimension is
the elucidation of the range of possible responses to the competitor
behaviour, the range of subsequent competitor responses, and the
consideration of future action alternatives; we have labelled this
dimension "implication". Each dimension addresses a different question.
Data management asks "What do we know?"; analysis asks "What does it
mean?"; and implication asks "How should we respond?" (Exhibit 1).
At first glance this model may also seem like a sequential "value added
chain": first one gathers information and classifies, stores, retrieves it
and so on; next, one analyzes it; then one assesses the implications for
one's own behaviour. However, as an ongoing system it is interactive,
not sequential. The data management dimension is (or should be)
continuously fed by the value added information produced on the analysis
dimension. That value added information itself has to be stored,
retrieved, disseminated, and so on. And information about competitor
responses to company moves that were at least in part the result of value
adding on the implication dimension must also be handled by the data
management dimension. The activities of the analysis dimension that deal
with assumption specification and testing should be continuously informed
by the work being done on the implications dimension. The three
dimensions should be genuinely interactive, not sequential, although in the
early stages of the evolution of the Cl function they may be sequential-
- and a great deal of value added information may be lost as a result.
The fact that an activity or a dimension adds value to information does
not automatically mean that it is "valuable" to the firm. Just as it is
possible for a product to be "over-engineered" -- that is, to have more
value added than the market or the organization requires -- so it is
possible for information to be "over-processed" -- to have value added
unnecessarily. But understanding systematically the nature of the
activities by which value is added to information is a necessary first step
to the judgment of how much value adding is needed for a particular
organization or a paricular use. For example, all six uses of Cl identified
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EXHIBIT 1 : DIMENSIONS OF VALUE ADDING
IMPLICATION
(HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND?)
YSIS
(WHAT DOES IT MEAN' )DATA MANAGEMENT
(WHAT DO WE KNOW?)
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in our first report -- sensitization, benchmarking, legitimation,
inspiration, decision-making, and planning -- usually require some value
adding on all three dimensions. But the importance of the value added
on each dimension varies according to the primary use of the information.
Decision-making and planning, if they are to be effective, are the two
uses which require the most value adding on the implication dimension,
since a careful consideration of the range of feasible responses to
competitor behaviour is an essential part of both. Clients who expressed
uneasiness with the very concept of Cl on the grounds that it carried the
danger of producing mindless imitation of a competitor were, consciously
or not, worried that the organization would make a direct leap from the
data management and analysis dimensions to action, without sufficient
consideration of the possibility of alternatives to competitor matching. In
other words, their concern is that insufficient value will be added on the
implications dimension. For both benchmarking and legitimation, while
data management processes are obviously a prerequisite, the information
requires considerable systematic analysis to provide usable benchmarks or
the convincing evidence of the link between a particular structure or
process and performance that legitmates a particular organizational
decision. And for sensitization and inspiration, often simply getting and
distributing the information about a competitor's behaviour, with very
little value added on the analysis or implications dimension, is enough.
In our analysis of the assessments of the reasons why competitor
analysis in these three companies had not yet met the expectations that
its internal "clients" held for it, we found that data management issues
loom larger for scanners than for clients, and implications issues for
clients than for scanners. However, the greatest gap between the two
groups is on the crucial middle dimension of Analysis, where the clients
are much more inclined to perceive major inadequacies than the scanners
themselves (28% of the clients vs. 12% of the scanners mentioned this as
a problem area).
The following sections take one of the three value adding dimensions
and discuss the processes involved and some of the patterns common
across the three firms.
DATA MANAGEMENT
The motive for formalizing the Data Management dimension of the Cl
function was expressed by one client when he said, "We need a better
understanding of what we know. We have a fairly good informal system,
but we need to formalize and publish what we know." Data Management
involves the activities that are most routinized and most disliked by
scanners themselves. One of our questions to scanners was "What do you
like most and least about your job?" The most frequent responses on the
least liked aspect concerned data management: "reading all those journals,
photocopying, and filing;" "the mechanics of number crunching;" "passing
on information in multiple copies in set formats that haven't changed in
years;" "getting people to put in information;" "when information is too
detailed and complex to categorize for the data base" -- these are just
some of the responses. Each of the ten data management processes--
acquisition, classification, storage, retrieval, editing, verification,
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presentation, aggregation, distribution, and assessment -- adds value to
the information, and most are essential for all information. But each
activity requires a slightly different set of skills, it requires time, and
the value that it add% is all too often invisible both to clients and to the
scanners themselves.
The following section examines the current practices and problems in
the three companies on each of the data management processes. With
very few exceptions, Cl specialists in all three companies are responsible
for the full range of value adding processes in data management. As a
result, they complain, they have too little time left for analyzing the
data. One of the key issues is improving the performance of the Cl
function is to discover ways to reduce the time allocated to Data
Management by Cl analysts without reducing the level of value added--
indeed, if possible to raise the level of value added.
1. ACQUISITION
Bringing information across the boundaries of the firm and collecting it
in the Cl function adds value to that information, just as "procurement"
is an important element of adding value in a processing industry. But
how that information is acquired and from what sources are complicated
issues.
A longstanding category of analysis in environmental scanning in
general is the distinction between surveillance (routinized reference to a
basic set of sources) and search (a focused hunt for specific information).
While most of our respondents immediately recognized the validity of
these two modes, they had difficulty estimating how their time was
divided between the two, because of the great amount of variation
between times when they were focused on specific projects and times
when they had more slack for surveillance. Scanners whose activities
were driven primarily by client demand for information tended to believe
they spent more time in search rather than surveillance; those who
produced newsletters spent more of their time in surveillance. But even
those whose activities were primarily search-focused felt that acquisition
was one of the most tedious parts of their job. As one respondent told
us, in response to our question about what he liked least about his job,
"Reading all the material is what I like least. Just getting the
information takes half my time; my productivity would be increased if the
collection of the information could be farmed out... Any well-trained
secretary can gather information; interpreting it is what requires the
skill."
Discussions of surveillance and search in the general literature on
environmental scanning refer primarily to external sources. But an
important reason for setting up the Cl function is to tap systematically
the organization's own internal sources of competitor information as well
as the external sources. Most scanners spend at least some of their time
identifying and cultivating key people within their own organizations who
pick up important and timely information about competitors.
Table 1 summarizes the answers given in the interviews to the
question, "What are your major sources of information about competitors?"
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TABLE 1: ACQUISITION: SOURCES 9F Cl(based on 53 scanner interviews )
Number of scanners %
INTERNAL 49 92.5
Personal contacts 25 47.2
(other CI people) (15) (28.3)
Internal reports/data 25 47.2
Overseas subsidiaries 13 24.5
Own data base 3 5.7
EXTERNAL 45 84.9
Publications/documents 38 71.7
Consultants/contract services 16 30.2
Informal personal contacts 13 24.5
Online databases 9 17.0
Trade shows 7 13.2
7.
It shows that scanners are indeed using both internal and external
sources. Over 90% of the scanners cited at least one source of internal
information as important to them, while nearly 85% mentioned at least
one external source. On the other hand, the single most commonly cited
source was external publications and documents, a fact which may explain
the perception of many clients that the Cl function is better at getting
external than internal information. The second most frequently mentioned
external source was the external consultant or contract service: over 30%
of the scanners report currently using such services to collect external
information (clearly using an outside service to collect internal
information is beyond the bounds of feasibility or desirability).
Personal contacts are important as sources both externally and
internally, but they are more important internally -- again providing an
indication that the Cl function is indeed tapping into internal sources.
However, it is important to note the salience of "other Cl people" among
the internal personal sources. Fifteen of the scanners mentioned other
CI people as important elements of their internal information network,
and this is worthy of note because it suggests strongly the importance of
the formal Cl network in moving information across SBUs, functions,
geographic units, and levels (none of the individuals mentioned in this
context were people in the same Cl unit). We should note that 12 of the
15 scanners were in the company that has developed the most extensive
formal parallel CI systems.
It is also interesting to note that although we may have entered the
"age of IT," for the scanners we interviewed, personal contacts are still a
more important external source (cited by 25%) than online data bases
(17%), despite the increasingly aggressive marketing efforts of data base
companies and consultants. Only three scanners mentioned their own
data base as a major source. One had created a personal text data base
of trade press clippings that were put on line by an outside firm which
used an optical scanner. The other two cited pre-existing market share
or marketing data bases that contained competitor information. (Note:
several other scanners pointed out that they contributed material to a
data base, but they did not mention these data bases as sources of useful
information for their own work.)
Table 1 aggregates the data from all three companies, and therefore
does not capture an important dimension of variation across the three
firms. The balance between internal and external sources in any company
is strongly influenced by the richness of the external information
environment. Industries vary considerably in the extent to which an
external information market has developed to provide detailed competitor
information. Take, for example, the automobile industry and the
photographic materials industry. The automobile industry has an
extensive trade press and receives considerable attention in the general
business press. Moreover, a number of firms that specialize in providing
industry and firm-level information actively market their services to the
major auto firms. In contrast, the photographic materials industry
receives comparatively little attention in the general business press, and
while consumer-oriented trade publications have proliferated, they contain
relatively little information on competing firms, as opposed to competing
products. Among the major factors which determine the richness of the
external information environment are the following: the number of
competitors, the scale of the industry, and the level of overlap across
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other industries (which determine the size of the potential market for
external information suppliers); and the level of regulation (which
influences the amount of public sector information available).
In an information-rich external environment, clients are likely to feel
that they are generally well-informed about their competitors from their
own reading, and that they do not need the Cl function to pick up
general external information for them. Instead they expect the Cl
function to draw in the more detailed and focused competitor information
that resides within the firm. In an information-lean environment, by
contrast, managers can rely much less on their own "surveillance" of
external published material to keep them abreast of their competitors'
strategic behaviour, and they are more likely to value external
information that is sought out and provided to them by the Cl function.
We do not have independent measures of the richness of the external and
internal information flows for our three companies, but our observations
strongly suggested that the motor vehicle industry and the petroleum
industry sustained much richer external information markets than the
photographic materials industry. We found when we tabulated the
distribution of responses across the companies that our expectations about
the effect of the external information markets on acquisition patterns
were borne out. In information-rich environments, scanners relied more
heavily on internal information; in relatively information-lean
environments, the resort to external information was much greater.
The density of internal information flows -- in other words, the
corporation's internal information environment -- also influences the
pattern of sources, especially the balance within the internal sources
between documents and personal contacts. The denser the internal
informal information flows within a corporation, the greater we would
expect to find the reliance on internal personal contacts rather than
internal documents. In Table 1, the balance between the two is
identical: 47% of the scanners mentioned each source. However, this
balance conceals an interesting difference across the three companies.
In the absence of any "hard" measures of internal information density
we tried to place each of the three companies on the continuum between
"rich" and "lean" on the basis of our own experience of several weeks
duration. When we looked at the distribution across the three companies
in the number of respondents who cited internal personal contacts and
internal reports and data collections as important sources, we found that
the company we located closest to the centre of the continuum had the
most balanced distribution; the company we had characterized as having a
"lean" informal information environment was strongly biased toward
internal documents, and the company that prided itself on its "rich"
informal information network had the greatest reliance on personal
sources.
The current role of IT in acquisition is somewhat less than we
expected, particularly in the acquisition of external information through
online data bases. When we asked some of those scanners who were not
using online data bases what was preventing them from doing so, they
indicated that the major impediments were inadequate information about
the quality and relevance of the data bases for their work; a lack of
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training in using such systems; the feeling that most external data bases
contained information that was too general for their needs (this was
especially common among SBU CI people); and the high cost. Several
indicated that having a corporate "centre of expertise" that could provide
up-to-date information and training and shared access to key external
data bases would be extremely useful, but none of the three companies
currently provided such services, at least in the perception of the
scanners .
The use of IT in external information acquisition may well be greater
than Table 1 indicates, although it may be indirect: the external
consultants and services may be making use of external online data bases
to produce their "product". Such services may be able to provide the
benefits of such services at lower costs, because they can reap the
advantages of scale and scope in a way that its client firms cannot. Why
then is there not more extensive contracting out of the acquisition of
external information? One "manager of scanners" gave some convincing
reasons for keeping at least part of the process in-house. His company
has decided to contract out external acquisition for a certain set of
competitors while keeping it in-house for a very small number of key
"corporate" competitors (that is, firms which compete across the dominant
businesses and most major product lines). There are two benefits from
this system. The first is that the level of understanding of those core
competitors is so much higher within the firm than it is outside, even in
a specialized contractor, that more value is added by keeping the process
inside. Second, having in-house acquisition enables him to benchmark the
external contractors and assess their costs (and the quality and scope of
the product), and having the external contractors provides a benchmark
for the internal process. In SBUs, however, where a single individual
may have the sole responsibility for the entire Cl value adding process,
there may be little choice but to contract out all of this process. The
external contractor can feasibly undertake both external surveillance and
search, and indeed they may have some advantages in search, because
they can approach the competitors' suppliers and customers and even in
some cases the competitor itself for information.
We came across only one example of an apparently successful
application of IT to the routinized collection of internal information, and
that was in one SBU where the competitor scanner had created a "news
hotline" using a voice-messaging system, where the sales people in the
field could call a dedicated number and leave a message about any
competitor behaviour they thought was of potential use to other sales
people, primarily technical product information and pricing data, outside
as well as inside the home country. As the scanner described it, he
received between 10 and 15 calls a day, often concerning the same trend.
If he received no disconfirming reports within the next twenty-four
hours, he put out a "news broadcast" over the voice messaging system,
summarizing the news received. It is worth noting that IT is not used to
store this information; the scanner takes notes and puts them in a file.
It is important to note several key factors behind the apparent success of
this system: the contributors are not required to add value to their
information by classification, storage, or editing; contribution is on a
voluntary basis; and the contributors quickly receive value-added
information back (that is, information which has been subject to some of
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the Data Management processes and in most cases to some analysis). It
is important to note that the incentive to contribute is not recogition or
reward, but value added information.
2. CLASSIFICATION, STORAGE, AND RETRIEVAL
These are three distinct processes in terms of the activites and the
skill levels involved, but all three are integrally linked to the storage
mode. Classification is the generation and assignment of categories for
the information, and it remains a necessary condition for effective
storage and retrieval largely owing to the fact that very little Cl is
currently stored in an electronic form that would allow searching and
retrieval through the use of key words. Despite several efforts within
the companies we have examined to set up a central Cl data base, none
is as yet functioning; Cl is still primarily stored in hard copy or on word
processors that lack extensive keyword search capacities. The role of IT
in classification is inextricably linked to the use of IT in storage: as its
use in storage rises, the value added in classification will decrease.
Currently the dominant mode of storage is the filing cabinet, and this
creates serious problems on all three value adding processes. Scanners
complained of the "bulging file cabinet" and its associated inefficiencies:
the problem of running out of storage space; the problem of deciding
which file was appropriate for a complex document (classification); the
problem of retrieving information speedily when one's only guide was a
certainty that "I knew I'd seen that information in an article only a week
or so ago, but I couldn't remember where I'd put it." Most Cl
specialists have no formal training as information handlers, and so they
devise their own idiosyncratic methods of classification. Often their best
guide to finding information in their files is their own memory of where
they put it or of when they filed it. As a result, even though
classification, filing, and retrieval are tedious and low-skill tasks, they
are reluctant to hand them over to clerical staff, fearing -- rightly--
that to do so would lower rather than raise their ability to make
efficient use of the information they are storing. However, when another
individual takes over the position, the stored information is virtually
unusable, given the impenetrability of the classification system.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the more analysis a Cl
output contains, the more difficult it is to classify the information neatly
and parsimoniously for subsequent retrieval. This is one of the factors
behind complaints that the Cl function's outputs are not sufficiently
cumulative. The most difficult classification, storage, and retrieval tasks
are often those associated with the analytical outputs of the Cl function
itself. These documents often have limited circulation, and yet the
information and analysis might be of inestimable use to another analyst
working on a slightly different aspect of the same competitor(s). Yet
because the documents are "stand-alone" productions, whose analysis is
rarely added to the "filing cabinet", Cl analysts not involved in its
production may not even be aware that it exists. One of the companies
is trying to remedy this by creating an annotated bibliography of Cl
outputs. This effort at classification is laudable, but the problem of
retrieval has yet to be addressed: even when a Cl specialist finds a
reference to a potentially useful document, there is no central storage
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repository that would make its retrieval speedy and effortless. The Cl
person must obtain it from whoever is listed as its producer -- which
may well be someone who no longer has Cl responsibility, or who is away
from their desk for the critical time period. As this example shows, a
solution to a problem on one Data Management process may be excellent
in itself, but if related problems on other processes are ignored, the
solution may well fail to make any difference, despite the expenditure of
considerable time and effort.
Classification systems that separate out "hard" and "soft" information
may simplify problems of storage and retrieval through the creation of at
least two distinct kinds of files or data bases: quantitative "key
indicators" files and descriptive, explanatory text files. However, this can
raise the level of resistence of SBUs and subunits to sharing Cl with
other units. One "manager of scanners" gave us an excellent example of
this. In one important product area, the SBU had collected information
that showed that while the company's own sales had stayed virtually flat
over a certain period of time, the principal competitor's had risen
considerably. However, that period was a one of transition to a new
production process that entailed unforeseen quality problems, and in the
eyes of the SBU the fact that the company had prevented its sales from
falling represented a triumph of marketing. When the sales figures were
taken out of that report and separated from this context, however, they
were used to show the superiority of the competitor's marketing.
Developing C classification and storage systems that do not require the
uncoupling of quantitative and contextual descriptive information is
probably an essential condition for the more open sharing of Cl across
units and for the accurate analysis of information. It can also save time
at later stages of the value adding, when the context usually has to be
added back in.
Understandably all three companies have experimented with the
possibility of creating a central on-line competitor data base that would
include all important information about major competitors and be widely
accessible throughout the corporation, thus simultaneously solving the
problems of classification (such classification as would be necessary would
be standardized throughout the company, and the capacity of an on-line
system for keyword search would lower the value added contribution of
classification anyway), storage capacity, and retrieval, and would make it
possible for more value adding processes to be carried on outside the
formal Cl function. None of these efforts has as yet produced an
operating central on-line data base, an issue to which we shall return
later in the paper.
Where internally created text data bases exist, there is all too often
inadequate clerical support to put the information into the machine, and
especially in SBUs, scanners spend much of their time creating their own
text storage on word processing systems. The keyword search capacity of
these systems is also all too often inadequate: it is oriented to editing
and spelling-checks, rather than content searches. The use of optical
scanners to store text is surprisingly infrequent: we came across only one
example of this, which was contracted out to a firm that specialized in
the creation of such text data bases.
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3. EDITING AND VERIFICATION/QUALITY CONTROL
Both these processes involve managing the stored data. Editing is
primarily the task of weeding out information that is outdated or no
longer relevant and either placing it in "dead storage" or discarding it
altogether. Verification/quality control is the process of checking to
make sure that the stored information is accurate. Again, both these
processes are fairly routine and because the value they add is often
invisible to scanners and clients alike these tasks tend to get neglected
under the pressure of time. One of the reasons for the "bulging file
cabinet" problem is that its keeper never has the time to sit down and
weed out information that has been made obsolete or to cross-check
various sources to ensure that the information stored is the most
accurate available.
Editing involves far less specialized knowledge that verification and
quality control, and can be undertaken by someone with very little
specialized training once the basic principles are established and an
appropriate repository for "dead storage" set up so that information is
not completely lost should an error of judgment be made. Editing is
facilitated if a system whereby information that is used is "tagged" in
some way so that unused material can be readily identified. Editing adds
value to information processing because it reduces search and retrieval
time and thereby increases the efficiency of "processing". It is analogous
to the practice of "keeping a clean work space" so important in Japanese
approaches to Quality Control and productivity enhancement, and it tends
to be ignored in Western organizations for much the same reasons as it is
resisted in Western factories: it is seen as a "waste of time" and an
uninteresting housekeeping task.
Verification and quality control are far more demanding, both for
external and internal information. One scanner responded to a question
about how he made judgments on the quality of the external information
he received by saying, "The critical capability is derived from reading a
lot of stuff on the same topic." Checking the validity of internally
derived information is an even more demanding task. The formal Cl
system is caught in the dilemma that it is expected to make use of
internal information, and yet managers often believe internal information
is biased. For example, as one manager of the Cl function said to us,
"The primary source of information on competitor pricing is our sales
people, but they are always wanting to lower prices and they will pass
along any information that seems to justify that." Because of the
important role of Cl in legitimation, internal information sources are
strongly suspected of bias, even when the information they provide is
highly valued as more immediate and up-to-date than most external
information. The extra effort needed to verify internal information often
means that even while it is collected it is not used.
4. AGGREGATION AND PRESENTATION/FORMATTING
Aggregation is the putting together of pieces of information in terms of
physically putting them side by side. It should be clearly distinguished
from synthesis, one of the analytical processes that makes the whole
greater than the sum of the parts by adding a level of interpretation of
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the emergent pattern as a whole. Aggregation is one of the value adding
processes in the production of a newsletter, for example (the others are
retrieval and dissemination). A newsletter may or may not involve the
process of presentation/formatting, which involves the use of graphics,
tables, and other methods of summarizing information or presenting it
vividly to enhance its impact.
In the absence of a shared on-line system, aggregation is an important
value adding process in sharing information across levels or functions.
Newsletters and similar aggregations often are more highly valued outside
the unit for which they are ostensibly produced. Cl specialists often
cited the newsletters of other Cl units as important internal sources of
information. They have the advantage of providing relatively low valued
added information in a form that is easy to classify and incorporate into
files.
Presentation/formatting involved a different kind of aggregation than
the text aggregation referred to above. It involves aggregating
quantitative data and putting them into standardized summarizing formats
such as bar graphs and pie charts. It also involves the techniques of
presenting and organizing qualitative information to make it eye-catching
and quickly comprehensible, techniques that include the use of
"headlines", executive summaries, and many of the techniques developed
by newspapers and magazines to increase the visual appeal of information.
The value added by presentation and formatting in the Cl function seems
to be growing, with the proliferation of desktops with "user-friendly"
graphics software and desktop publishing programmes. When such
presentation techniques are used irregularly, the Cl specialist can
experience some difficulties in having to re-learn the system: in one unit,
where several months pass between the formatting of data for reports,
scanners mentioned this as one of the factors that reduced the time they
had for analysis. Effective presentation and formatting can greatly
enhance the impact of data- they can also, if not used carefully, induce
misleading interpretations.) The growing use of statistical graphics
packages by people whose statistical training is negligible (or
considerable, but rusted by disuse) is evoking warnings from statistical
experts in a number of corporate contexts, not just in Cl.
5. DISSEMINATION
Dissemination involves three key questions: what form should the CI
outputs take, how should they be delivered, and to whom should they go?
Dissemination is, next to acquisition, the Data Management process that
is the focus of the most sustained concern. There are basically two
types of CI outputs: regular (provided at set intervals) and irregular (or
"as requested"). These can be delivered in three ways: in "hard copy"
(or written form), orally, or electronically. The kinds of Cl outputs we
encountered in the three firms are mapped onto these variables in Exhibit
2.
The Cl specialists throughout each company have considerable latitude
in deciding on the frequency of outputs and the most effective mode of
delivery. Scanners in general expressed a strong preference for oral
presentations, either in tandem with written reports or instead of them.
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EXHIBIT 2: DISSEMINATION
DELIVERY FREQUENCY
MODE
REGULAR "AS NEEDED"
Newsletters Strategic profiles
WRITTEN Annual competitor profiles of competitors
Quarterly Reports Briefing notes
Planning cycle support
documents
II Special project
reports
ORAL I Annual review of Briefings
I competitors Informal handoff
Responses to
queries
,
ELECTRONIC: News Broadcasts "News flashes"
Responses to
electronic mail
, I
EXHIBIT 3: DISSEMINATION IN DIFFERENT INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS
INTERNAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
DENSE THIN
EXTERNAL As needed - As needed -
Oral/written Written/electronic
RICH
I NFORMATION I
LEAN
Regular -
Oral/written
Regular -
Written/electronic
ENVI RONMENT
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Many scanners often feel more comfortable giving inte tions of the
significance of the "data" orally rather than in writing cart because
they are then able to modify their interpretations b. on additional
information given by their hearers and in part -ause if their
interpretations turn out to be less than completely accurate, they are less
likely to be cited later as evidence of incompetence. Moreover, because
oral presentations are interactive, they can serve to collect information
as well as to disseminate it. Because they require the sustained attention
of those attending, they are more visible to the client community than
written documents. Finally, the opportunity for the scanners to interact
with the clients is both personally gratifying and helpful in building
learning curves in the function because it helps clarify what the clients
want.
Of the three modes of dissemination, the electronic was the least
frequently mentioned. The principal example of electronic dissemination
of regular outputs was the "news broadcast" mentioned above. The voice
messaging system was also mentioned by other Cl people in the same
company as a way of disseminating "news flashes": urgent items of
information about a competitor. Voice-messaging systems that allow one
message to be distributed to a pre-defined list of recipients are well
suited to such transmissions. Whether this mode is preferred to an on-
line mode such as electronic mail seems to be largely a function of
internal Information Systems culture. Since many managers find voice-
messaging a more congenial technology than an on-line electronic mail
system, it may prove to be a more effective dissemination mode, at least
for the next few years. In at least one company, it seemed to be a
frequently-used method of communicating within the C community
internationally.
The use of electronic dissemination seems to be increasing; however, it
is not replacing either written or oral modes so much as it is adding a
new mode for information that might otherwise not be passed on, or
might not be passed on in so rapid a fashion. For most outputs, the
clients themselves expressed a strong preference for hard copy or oral
presentations rather than electronically delivered outputs. The reason
many of them gave was the superior portability of hard copy outputs and
the fact that what they wanted from the Cl function was value added Cl
-- analysis -- that did not lend itself easily to electronic form.
In general, the richer the external information market, the greater the
need for the Cl function to target its activities on specific managerial
issues and problems and to produce "as needed" outputs rather than
regular and routinized outputs. And the denser the internal information
networks, the more effective are oral as opposed to written outputs: oral
modes of dissemination add value to the information because it gets
shared, discussed, and debated. Combining these hypotheses, we can
begin to suggest what kinds of outputs might be most effective in which
environments (Exhibit 3).
There remains the issue of "to whom". Scanners themselves tend to
prefer the widest possible distribution, in part because that is a way of
enhancing the visibility of the function and thereby potentially increasing
the function's ability to draw in Cl from various parts of the company.
Several scanners (in all three companies) mentioned that they felt
considerable frustration with the reluctance of senior management to
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encourage wide circulation of Cl outputs, especially those that contained
analysis and interpretation or internally-derived Cl. The higher the
level of value-added in the Cl outputs, the greater the resistence to
broad circulation tends to become. This adds dissemination to the list
of processes (the others are classification, storage, and retrieval) that
are more difficult for high value-added Cl.
6. ASSESSMENT
This is an aspect of information value adding that certainly exists in
at least two of the three companies, but on a fairly irregular basis: it
consists of the collection and analysis of data on the evaluation and use
of Cl outputs, and the conducting of "post mortem" analyses of special
CI projects. The distribution of evaluation sheets after major
presentations and the inclusion of an evaluation sheet with major Cl
documents are the least intrusive measurement instruments, although
their subsequent processing and analysis may take considerable time.
And since time is one of the extremely scarce resources in the CI
function, the assessment process tends to be one of the most neglected
in the Data Management dimension. Yet it is extremely important in
contributing to learning curves in the function, if -- and only if -- some
use is made of the information so collected: that is, if it is used not
simply as a signal to the clients that their opinions are valued.
ANALYSIS
Each of the three dimensions of C is necessary and important, but if
one dimension had to be singled out as critical to the success of the
formal Cl function, it would be analysis. Yet in many companies, well
beyond the three in this particular study, the focus of the formal
function is on Data Management, especially acquisition. The approach
often seems to be that described by one disgruntled client as "They're
trying to pull in everything from everywhere, hoping someone will use it
some day."
Analysis uses the information supplied by the Data Management
processes and continually feeds value-added information back into the
Data Management system. The basic processes in Analysis are
synthesis, hypothesis, and assumptions specification and testing.
Synthesis puts different items of information together to form an
emergent "map" that is greater than the sum of the parts. For example,
the analysts may combine data on a competitor's pricing behaviour on
several related product lines, its stated corporate goals, patenting
behaviour and new product development, and produce an interpretation
of the competitor's behaviour that suggests strongly that it is moving
towards the market in a new product area. Hypothesis is the
construction of "what if?" scenarios and "If...then" analyses: for example,
if Competitor X is planning to enter this product area, these are the
indicators we would expect to see; or, Competitor X has just done this,
and here are the likely effects on its subsequent competitive behaviour
in these product lines. Both synthesis and hypothesis are only as good
as the assumptions on which they are built, and therefore an important
part of the value adding process in Analysis is the explication and
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testing of those assumptions. Indeed, the frequently heard statement
that, "Analysis is only as good as the data on which it is based" is less
accurate that the statement that "Analysis is only as good as the
assumptions on which it is based." If the data are wrong but the
assumptions right, exposing the errors in the data means that the
analysis can quickly be corrected. If the data are right and the
assumptions wrong, correction is much more time-consuming and
difficult.
An important part of this process is drawing out and refining the
underlying assumptions about what drives competitor behaviour that are
held by the clients of the function. Managers and planners are
continuously, of necessity, making their own assumptions about what
drives competitors' behaviour, some of which are well-founded and some
of which may lead to inappropriate competitive responses. The Cl
function, by laying bare its own assumptions in the course of presenting
its competitor analyses, can help elicit, refine and improve the working
assumptions of its clients -- and of its own analysts.
Clients, as we observed in our first working paper, want more analysis
from the Cl function. And the scanners themselves not only have a
strong stake in meeting those expectations; many of them also find
analysis the dimension of Cl which is most personally rewarding. Over a
third of the scanners replied to our question "What do you like most
about your job?" with some mention of the analysis dimension, such as:
"When the bits and pieces come together and you pass it off to people
who can really use it, that's great;" "the challenge of analyzing a
company: its's like a puzzle -- you start with nothing and piece it
together;" "getting a data dump two inches thick and making inferences
and analyses." If clients want more analysis, and many scanners
thoroughly enjoy analyzing, why is more analysis not done?
Scanners provided us with three sets of impediments to expanding the
analysis dimension. The first was simply lack of time, which occurred
for two reasons: Data Management tasks simply ate up most of the time,
and clients, unrealistic about how long it takes to produce a good
analysis, set deadlines that could only be met with a very slight
enhancement of a "data dump". The second impediment was the lack of
an established discipline that provided well-tested assumptions and
analytical techniques for doing competitor analysis. In contrast to
economic analysis or political risk analysis, undergirded by the fields of
economics and political science respectively, competitor analysis is a
complex, interdisciplinary field that is only beginning to develop as an
academic and commercial specialty. It is not possible to enhance the Cl
function by bringing in someone with a Ph.D. in competitor analysis.
Third, the corporate culture often makes it much more costly for
individuals to make incorrect predictions or to put forth analyses whose
assumptions get discredited than for them to make no attempt at
analysis. However, for the Cl function as a whole, in the long run, the
costs of providing no analyses are much higher than the costs of making
incorrect analyses from which the function can learn. In other words,
the reward and incentive structures for individuals run counter to the
long-run interests of the function. As one Cl person who indicated
analysis as what he most liked about his job put it, "I'd rather make 25
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predictions and have 20 of them right than 3 and have them all right.
But I'm not sure that attitude is shared in my company, and they make
it very embarrassing for you if you're wrong." Or as another scanner in
a technical function put it, "In the technical community, credibility is
based on always being right."
One of the key problems for the Analysis dimension is therefore
unrealistic expectations on the part of the client community -- and all
too frequently on the part of the scanners themselves. As one manager
put it, "Business is a poker game, and it sure helps to see the other
guy's hand." If clients expect the CI function to provide the "crystal
ball" that lets them see into the future in a way that eliminates
uncertainty about the competitive environment, then they will be sorely
disappointed and the function will have a relatively short life span.
Predicting the behaviour of competitors is even more difficult than
predicting the behaviour of one's own company.
Another problem was suggested by an MIS expert in one of the
companies, who said, "The top management in the company made it clear
that they believed not enough systematic analysis of competitors was
being done around here, but as the message passed down the line it was
translated into "have competitor information to satisfy the planning
requirements." Many managers and even C specialists tend to believe
that the important part of CI is getting the data, which can then "speak
for themselves." In other words, the complexity and the importance of
value adding on the analysis dimension can be seriously underestimated.
The outputs of the analysis dimension can be either regular or on an
ad hoc basis. Analysis can be directed to producing regular profiles of
competitors that may be either general or issue-specific: for example, an
annual general strategic review of key competitors, or regular profiles of
how competitors are responding to certain key environmental or internal
changes, such as fluctuating exchange rates or changing commodity
prices. In industries where the external information markets are lean,
where there are significant new entrants or potential new entrants, or
where key competitors are undergoing major internal reorganizations and
shifts in strategy, general profiles may be important, although how often
they should be updated remains an open question. In industries with
rich external information markets, few new entrants, and stable
competitors, issue-targeted analyses are more highly valued.
The C function is also asked to produce intermittent client-requested
"as needed" analyses. These will have real value, as many scanners
pointed out to us, to the extent that the clients specify their needs: as
one scanner said, "Good analysis depends on the question." The more
clearly the clients can specify what they hope to do with the analysis,
the more clearly analysts can focus on picking and testing the critical
assumptions and building the most useful syntheses and hypotheses.
We found relatively few examples of the use of IT on the Analysis
dimension. There were two systems currently in use that had been
designed by the analysts and put on-line. One was primarily useful for
synthesis: it showed the distribution of a certain type of competitor
assets in a way that allowed the analyst to assess quickly the impact of
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any competitor asset acquisition or divestment on the competitor's
overall position vis-a-vis his own company. Another was primarily used
for hypothesis: it showed the major competitors' manufacturing costs and
those of the analyst's own company in a way that allowed the analyst to
play out "what if" scenarios on changes in the costs of materials or
labour (although to date it had been received with some scepticism by
the client community, who had doubts about the accuracy of the profile
of the competitors' costs).
IMPLICATION
In our interviews, problems on the Implication dimension received more
mention from both clients and scanners than any other dimension. To
that extent there is a significant agreement between the two groups.
However, in the client interviews we encountered an interesting paradox.
Clients complained that Cl specialists too often dumped data about
competitors on them without telling them what it meant for their
business. On the other hand, some clients -- sometimes even the same
clients -- complained that analysts too often slanted the data towards a
particular course of action, and in the words of one manager, "I don't
want some analyst telling me how to run my business."
Value adding on the implication dimension should resolve this paradox.
This dimension centres on the explication of the range of possible
responses to competitor behaviour and the probable outcomes of those
responses. Because competitor behaviour is only a part of the estimation
of those outcomes, albeit an important part, the implication dimension
must involve expertise from outside the Cl function, especially from the
managers and planners who are the function's clients. As one client put
it, "Cl is at best two of the three pieces of the puzzle... To build
credible potential strategic options, you have to bring in people who
really know the business and the market." In other words, on this
dimension the data and the analysis from the other dimensions of Cl are
combined with data, analysis, and expertise on one's own company and
with data and analysis about other elements of the environment, and the
company's range of possible competitive responses considered and their
potential consequences assessed. Of course one element of those
potential consequences is the likely competitor response, and this means
that the value adding process on the implication dimension must interact
with the hypothesis processes of the analysis dimension. On the
implication dimension much of the value is added by combining the data
and analysis provided by the Cl specialists with the experience and
expertise of other information analysts, planners, and managers. In the
absence of value adding on this dimension, much of the data and
analysis provided on the other two dimensions will remain unused in two
areas of potential application, decision-making and planning, where the
value added on the implication dimension is critically important to its
use.
The critical question here is the extent to which Cl specialists should
be involved in adding value on the implication dimension, or whether
their value adding should be restricted to the data management and
analysis dimensions, with the value added information being handed over
to planners and managers who will then use it for the implication
dimension. In the three companies, there was considerable range even
within each company on the level of involvement of Cl specialists on the
20
III
implications dimension. As one might expect, there was much less
involvement of Cl specialists in the implication dimension at the
corporate level than at the SBU level. However, clearly the clients
expect value adding on the implication dimension from the Cl function.
It is equally obvious that effective value adding on the implication
dimension cannot come solely out of the efforts of the Cl function; the
users must actively be involved in the process. They can do so alone,
or with the involvement of the Cl specialist, but they cannot expect the
formal Cl function to do it alone. The failure to recognize this
constitutes one of the major impediments to the more effective use of
Cl in the large-scale corporation.
There are of course other impediments. One is the locus of
responsibility for providing material on one's own company that is
comparable to the data and analysis provided by the Cl function for the
competitors. Some Cl groups have clearly assumed this responsibility,
largely at their own initiative. Others have not had the resources or
the incentives to do so, and yet no other group has been given a clear
mandate to supply it to them for inclusion in the information processing
on the implication dimension. (There is of course the additional
complication that adding one's own company data to Cl formal outputs
tends to increase the incentives for management to restrict circulation.)
A second impediment is the credibility of the Cl specialist. Managers do
not enjoy discussing the implications of whatever decisions they might
make with subordinates who do not, in their view, understand the
business. A third and related factor is time: when managers and
planners are under time pressure -- which is the usual state of affairs-
-they are reluctant to spend any of this scarce resource educating the
Cl specialist. Finally, if management culture strongly emphasizes the
individual manager's mastery of decision-making and action, it can
seriously mitigate against a genuinely interactive process on the
implication dimension.
What are the arguments for involving the Cl specialists in the
implication dimension? Probably the strongest argument is that clearly
both clients. and scanners expect that this should be part of the Cl
function's tasks. Without the involvement of the Cl specialists, the
competitor information may well get lost in the welter of other, more
familiar types of information that are involved. Another reason is that
it helps build learning curves in the function: to the extent that Cl
specialists are involved on the implication dimension, they can build
their skills in this kind of value adding. A third is that it builds
individual learning curves as well as group learning curves, and in
companies which use the Cl position as a development assignment for
high-potential personnel, the implication dimension is perhaps the most
important aspect of the skills acquired in the function. Moreover, the
implication and the analysis dimension should be interactive, because the
range of likely competitor responses to one's own behaviour should often
be part of the implication process. Finally, to the extent that Cl is
incorporated into the in decision-making and planning processes, it
should improve the quality of decisions and plans -- to the extent that
Cl has major relevance to decision-making and planning in that aspect
of the company's activities. This may well be an important caveat:
despite the recent popularity of "competitive strategy" paradigms which
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assume a constant relevance of Cl in virtually all lines of business, and
the insistence of virtually all the clients that Cl was vitally important in
their business, more systematic assessment of "What would we do
differently if we knew that?" might reveal areas where C is of fairly
low relevance to company behaviour -- and therefore indicate where an
investment in the formal Cl function might not result in any significant
improvement in decision-making and planning quality.
GENERIC VALUE ADDING ISSUES
Each process in the three value adding dimensions involves some
process-specific issues, but three basic issues are common to all the
processes. The first is: how specific are the skills to Cl, and how much
do they have in common with other information management functions?
To the extent that the skills are nonspecific, that process may be
housed elsewhere than the C function, or may share resources with
another related function. The second is: what is the potential role of
Information Technology in that particular process? By taking the
examination of the IT role from the general level of "What is the role
of IT in the Cl function?" to its role in each process, it may be possible
to target the allocation of IT resources more effectively. And the third
common issue is: how feasible is it for the organization to contract out
that process? To the extent that the firm can "buy" rather than "make"
it can stretch its own staff resources at a time when growing demands
are being made on the Cl function even though the corporate climate is
strongly against "adding headcount". Exhibit 4 summarizes our
answers to each of these questions.
The specialization of CI skills on the Analysis dimension clearly
indicates that little sharing of resources on that dimension are possible.
It is the Data Management dimension that offers the best opportunities
for sharing resources and expertise with other staff functions that
require similar information management skills. The clerical tasks of
storing, retrieving, aggregating, and formatting could clearly be
performed in large part by information technicians shared with other
groups. Classification, editing, and dissemination are
somewhat more specialized, but with training by Cl scanners information
technicians could be trained to share these tasks. Internal acquisition,
verification/QC, and assessment will probably inevitably continue to be
the preserve of the Cl specialist.
The feasibility of contracting out a value adding process is greatest
for the acquisition of external information -- hardly a startling insight,
since all three firms are already contracting out some activity on this
process. It might also be possible to contract out
presentation/formatting, but the resulting saving of time and effort is so
small as so make the effort of administering the contract greater than
the saving. It might also be possible to contract out aggregation, to the
extent that internally derived information is included in the activity the
firm would want to ensure that there are tight controls on contractor
confidentiality. It is obvious why storage, retrieval, verification/QC,
dissemination, and assessment must be kept in-house. Classification may
be a more ambiguous process, but to the extent that it is based on
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EXHIBIT 4: VALUE ADDING PROCESSES IN DATA
MANAGEMENT DIMENSION
(Coding: ***=high; **=medium; *=low; -=none)
Level of C Role of IT "Buy"
Specificity Feasibility
DATA MANAGEMENT
Acquisition:
Internal **
External **
Classification ** **
Storage * ***
Retrieval -***
Editing ** ** *
Verification/QC ** *
Presentation ** **
Aggregation * **
Dissemination ** *
Assessment *** *
ANALYSIS
Synthesis *** *
Hypothesis *** **
Assumptions testing *** *
IMPLICATION ** * -
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idiosyncratic company needs, an outside agent is unlikely to comprehend
those as well as inside people, although outside expertise might be useful
in helping define the parameters of classification.
The potential role of IT in information value adding in the Cl function
is clearly higher than its current actual role, and in every company
there are serious efforts to increase the use of IT. Its potential
contribution is clearly greatest in acquisition, classification, storage, and
retrieval.
In external acquisition, the continuing proliferation of on-line data
bases raises considerably the potential role of IT. What is needed to
increase its use in this area is up-to-date and accurate assessment of
the worth of the external data bases and detailed instruction in their
use. Few companies have MIS groups that can provide this kind of
specialized expertise, and few Cl units have been able to develop it
internally. The potential role of IT in internal acquisition is
considerable, although it is probably less than the most optimistic
proponents of IT would suggest. The ideal of a huge electronic network
linking every desk in the company, with all individuals rountinely
feeding in each piece of information about competitors that comes across
that desk, has a powerful intuitive appeal. However, proponents tend to
underestimate the burden that such a system would place on the other
Data Management processes, particularly classification, storage, editing,
and verification/quality control. Efforts to create such a system have
generally tried to deal with the problem by having more of the value
adding done at the acquisition point: that is, to ask the person
contributing the information to classify it and do at least some
verification. But to the extent that the value added activities expected
of one person outside the formal Cl system multiply, the level of
probable cooperation will go down.
Where IT can probably have its greatest impact in internal acquisition
is in linking the community of Cl specialists throughout the company,
and in picking up "high value/low value added" information that has
immediate application potential. One of the problems facing the
architects of the Cl system is the extent to which its internal
"surveillance" (as opposed to "search", although the word suggests hidden
cameras) systems can and should be oriented to picking up such
information. This will undoubtedly vary considerably across SBUs, and
the relevance of such information for the larger Cl system may well be
quite low.
The role of IT in classification, storage, and retrieval has been
discussed in some detail above; it is here that IT can probably play its
greatest role. IT is also potentially useful in editing (allowing rapid
scanning of electronic files and effortless "tagging" that allows an editor
to see how often a particular set of data has been used); presentation/
formatting; and aggregation (through electronic "cut-and-paste" systems) 
IT could also be useful in "hypothesis": programmes that allow the
playing through of "what if" scenarios could be extremely useful (for
example, what effect would changes in exchange rates have on the
existing cost configurations of major competitors).
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This leaves verification/Quality Control, dissemination, sythesis,
assumption testing, and implication as areas where the potential
contribution of IT is quite low, at least for the foreseeable future. The
application of Al and expert systems in these areas might well change
this assessment, but at present the levels of expertise in these areas are
sufficiently low that translating existing expertise into an expert system
would probably be more harmful than helpful. The fact that the Cl
function is on a learning curve actually has implications that go well
beyond the limitations this places on the immediate resort to expert
systems. An MIS specialist we interviewed in one company pointed out
that one of the problems he faced was that every time a group changed
the use they were making of Cl (especially, in this case, each time they
changed the structure of the developmental plans that Cl was being used
to support), they wanted to change the structure of the system.
Moreover, the rapid turnover of people in the function made his job
difficult; each new person had different ideas about how the system
should be organized, and each person took about three months to
understand the existing system. When people moved on to a new job
virtually each year, the burden on the MIS support people became
considerable.
The limitations of the application of IT in the Cl function are as
important as the recognition of its potential contribution, because one of
the problems in the establishment of a central CI data base has been an
unrealistically high level of expectation of what such a data base can
do. The implication that it would simultaneously provide, as one MIS
expert put it, "a central source of data from which people could do their
own interpretation and analysis" and a repository of high value added
information that would allow managers to find quickly they competitor
information they needed to support their decision-making and planning
activities was clearly unrealistic. IT itself does not, at this point,
provide much help on the analysis and implications dimension. The idea
of solving the inadequate use of Cl by creating a data base that would
make each manager his own analyst is not feasible. The major
contribution of IT -- and it is an important one -- is in solving major
problems on the Data Management dimension, and its major clients for
that are in the Cl function itself. The Data Management dimension,
which looms so large for the C specialist, is and should be largely
invisible to the clients of the CI function. To put it in another way,
the main users of IT in the Cl function will be the CI specialists
themselves, not the clients of the function.
There remains a more comprehensive question on the "make-or-buy"
issue, and that concerns the feasibility of contracting out the design of
a CI Information System. Can internal MIS people provide the needed
expertise? The answer clearly must be based on an assessment of how
similar the IT issues in the CI function are to those in other functions,
and how much expertise in similar systems the in-house MIS community
has developed as a result, and on the level of outside expertise in
creating CI systems.
INTERACTIONS ACROSS THE THREE DIMENSIONS
Although the-three dimensions of value adding are analytically distinct,
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their interrelationships are complex and crucially important. Exhibit 5
indicates six of the major issues that concern the relationships across
the three dimensions.
One of the key issues that lies between the dimensions of Data
Management and Analysis, as we have seen, is the problem of processing
the value-added outputs of the Analysis dimension in the data
management processes, and the feedback from those processing to the
analysts so that output can be organized so as to facilitate such
processing. This issue is closely related to the problem of managing
both hard and soft information that was noted by a significant
proportion of both clients and scanners, but it clearly transcends it.
Value-added quantitative information that involves various levels of
analysis may also be extremely problematic: for example, the various
ways in which benchmarking comparisons between Japanese firms and
U.S. firms control for their very different levels of internal integration.
The second issue is the shaping of data management processes by the
needs of the analytical techniques developed on the Analysis dimension.
The needs of the Analysis dimension should be an important force
helping to target the acquisition of information and to improve the
structure of classification, storage, and retrieval. Data Management
processes that are shaped by the needs of Analysis will be more
efficient and effective than those which try to be encyclopaedic because
of a lack of guidance from Analysis. However, at the present stage of
the development of the Cl function, both the interaction on value-added
information and the targeting of Data Management processes are made
more difficult by the relatively slow development of analytical
techniques. The methods of C remain relatively underdeveloped, and
this causes problems not only on the Analysis dimension itself but also
on the interactions across dimensions.
This is also true for the relationship between Analysis and
Implications. One of the key issues here is the commonality of
assumptions across the two dimensions: the assumptions that undergird
the analysis of competitor behaviour must be shared by the managers
and planners who will integrate the output of the analysis into their
own response to competitors, or the outputs will be discredited and
ignored. To the extent that the assumptions on the analysis dimension
are not articulated, accepted and shared by clients, CI analysis that does
not fit the existing mental maps of its clients will not be used. Or
even worse, Cl analysis that does fit the mental maps of its clients will
be used, despite poorly articulated, untest, and unsophisticated
assumptions. A second issue on the Implication-Analysis relationship is
that of ownership: that is, the level of personal and organizational
investment that clients feel toward the outputs of the Analysis
dimension. When this is low, the outputs may well be ignored, no
matter how high their quality.
Finally, the relationship between the Implication and Data Management
dimension raises two important issues. One is the credibility problem
mentioned by clients and scanners alike in the assessments of Cl. To
the extent that those involved in the Data Management processes build
up a confidence in the quality, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of the
information they are delivering both to clients directly and to the
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EXHIBIT 5: INTERACTIONS ACROSS VALUE-ADDING
DIMENS IONS
IMPLICATION
Hard and Soft
Methodology / Theory
DATA
MANAGEMENT
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Assumptions
Ownership
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Analysis dimension, the contribution of Data Management to Implication
will be considerable. To the extent that the credibility is lacking, the
Cl function may be ignored. A second issue, also mentioned by scanners
in their assessments of the Cl function's problems, is feedback from
clients that helps target and focus not only acquisition but also the
other value adding processes of Cl. Data Management should be largely
driven by its interactions with the other two dimensions.
CONCLUSION
The three interactive dimensions of value adding provide a conceptual
framework for understanding the complexity of the processes by which
information about one important aspect of the external environment--
competitor behaviour -- can be processed within the corporation to
enhance its value. The potential role of Information Technology in
these processes is considerable, and yet it is still much greater in
potential than it currently is in reality. A clearer understanding of the
processes involved in adding value to competitor information can help to
guide the application of IT as well as the development of individual
expertise and organizational systems -- building learning curves -- in
the Cl function. If the importance of competitor information is really
as great as the managers and planners we interviewed believe, then the
investment of time and resources in building those learning curves is
clearly warranted.
28
FOOTNOTES
1. See S. Ghoshal, "Environmental Scanning: An Individual and
Organizational Level Analysis." Doctoral dissertation, Sloan
School of Management, 1985, and S. Ghoshal and S.K. Kim,
"Building effective intelligence systems for competitive
advantage," Sloan Management Review 28-1 (1986).
2. Taisei Kensetsu, one of Japan's Big Six general contractors,
set up a special system in 1975 that established a dedicated
telephone number for employees to call if they heard any
information that might be relevant to identifying a business
opportunity, and arranged for transmission of that information to
the appropriate business manager. Taisei estimated that within
five years of operation it had led to more than 200 orders with
earnings of twenty-seven billion yen. Okumura Tomoya,
Kensetsuavo. Atarashii Sanavo Rinen no Kakuritsu no tame ni.
Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, 1980.
3. As we saw in the examples given by clients of how they use CI, only
4 of 63 examples involved information that had immediate action implications.
4. At first this may seem identical with the three categories of analysis
used by Richard L. Daft and Karl E. Weick in their 1984 article, "Toward
a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems" (Academ of
Management Review 9-2: 284-295) which consists of information
acquisition, interpretation, and learning. It is different on several counts:
first, the data management dimension is much more than "acquisition;"
second, we separate out analysis (interpretation of what the information
means in terms of competitor behaviour) and implication (what the
information and analysis, combined with the knowledge of one's own
company, together suggest for one's own behaviour); and third, "learning"
is one of our value adding processes; learning, in the sense Daft and
Weick use it, is a result of using value added information, not an
information value adding process, although when learning about
competitors' behaviour is turned into information and added to the
company's information stock, it contributes to the value adding process.
5. One of the solutions to the scarce resource problems is to get
informants, especially within the organization, to assume more of
the value-adding tasks -- classification, editing, verification
and quality control in particular. But to the extent that these
activites require special skills and take time, efforts to push
off more of the value adding on the data management dimension
onto people whose jobs are not centred on adding value to Cl will
lower the incentives for involvement.
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6. See for example Leonard Fuld, Competitor Intelligence: How to get
it, How to use it (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985).
7. This number does not include two of the scanners who were
interviewed.- One was in the process of beginning the establishment of
a CI system and the sources were not yet routinized, and so the
respondent preferred not to answer that question; in the other, the
responses on sources were all given by another scanner with whom the
interview was jointly conducted, and the authors decided not to
double-count by ascribing those answers to both scanners.
8. See Management in the 1990s Working Paper 88-047: "The Competitor
Intelligence function in the very large-scale organization:
assessments and uses."
9. See Edward Tufte's work on statistical graphics and their use and
misuse in his book The Visual Display of Quantitative Information
(Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press, 1983).
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